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ABSTRACT
Given that China has the largest rural population in the world, the demand of finance is
very high. On one hand, Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) is moving to serve urban areas, and
Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs), currently the most important source of formal credit in rural
areas, are not doing very promisingly. On the other hand, nongovernmental programsmicrofinance institutions (NGO-MFIs) have been performing well in terms of reaching the poor
in the remote regions; however, due to the government’s regulations they are only allowed to
offer loans but not to take any deposits, thereby limiting their future development and growth.
This thesis aims to explore such microfinance challenges in China in detail, particularly
discussing the difficulties that NGO-MFIs with two case studies. Through the analysis of
successful NGO programs in Bangladesh, e.g. Grameem Bank, and government-sponsored
programs in Indonesia, the thesis will also suggest how China could possibly overcome the
existing challenges, subject to its unique socioeconomic and political environment. Possible
improvements include providing staff incentives and trainings, creating strict and clear client
selection criteria, diminishing dependence on donor funds, and establishing a better regulatory
environment for the development of NGO-MFIs, etc. Secondary sources of data and information
are employed and international comparative features of microfinance are the main focus.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
In 2000, 189 nations in five continents, such as China, Bangladesh, South Africa, Czech
Republic, and Argentina, agreed to free people from extreme poverty and multiple deprivations
by 2015 through achieving the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (United Nations
Development Progamme (UNDP), 2013). The very first goal is to eradicate extreme poverty and
hunger, and its one of the targets is to halve the proportion of people whose income is less than
USD1 a day (United Nations, 2012). One strategy to alleviate poverty is to provide financial
services to poor and low-income households. However, poor households, especially those who
live in rural areas, have been exclusively excluded from the formal banking sector, simply
because the conventional financial institutions incur greater transaction costs if lending a large
number of small loans, and they require borrowers to have good credit history and provide
collaterals in the form of financial assets, which most of the low-income people do not possess.
Although poor people can have access to loans through informal lenders, interest rates of this
kind of credit are normally very high.
In order to allow the poor people to gain access to credit market at affordable costs,
Mohammed Yunus invented the concept of “microfinance” and established the Grameen Bank
(GB) of Bangladesh in 1983. The GB has reached out to millions of poor people in Bangladesh,
particularly women, to help them walk out of poverty, and amazingly its loan recovery rate has
been remaining high (Grameen Bank, 2013). With the success of the GB, more and more
countries started microfinance (MF) programs for the purpose of poverty reduction. Kofi A.
Anan, the former UN Secretary General, once said, “…microfinance has proved its value, in
many countries, as a weapon against poverty and hunger. It really can change people’s lives for
the better, especially the lives of those who need it most” (Latifee, 2006).
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Basically, microfinance can be narrowly defined as the provision of loans, savings,
insurances, and other basic financial services to the low-income clients, including the selfemployed (Ledgerwood, 1999). With a broader definition, microfinance is referred as “smallscale financial services – primarily credit and savings – provided to people who farm or fish or
herd; who operate small enterprises or microenterprises where goods are produced, recycled,
repaired or sold; who provide services; who work for wages or commissions; who gain income
from renting out small amounts of land, vehicles, draft animals, or machinery and tools; and to
other individuals and groups at the local levels of developing counties, both rural and urban”
(Robinson, 2003).

i) How Do Microfinance Programs Operate?
Generally, three fundamental mechanisms, i.e. group lending, dynamic incentives, and
regular repayment schedule, allow MF programs to operate effectively and achieve high
repayment rates (Ray, 1998).
First of all, group lending includes the concepts of peer selection and peer monitoring.
For instance, the Grameen Bank (GB) has the lending policy that no member in the group can
borrow again if defaults occur. This policy encourages individuals to form groups carefully in
the very beginning and rule out bad borrowers, who do risky businesses or do not repay on time,
in order to avoid any incidence of defaults. Thus, individuals with similar characteristics such as
comparable credit history tend to group together, as long as they can identify one another,
thereby driving the risky borrowers out of groups. In addition to peer selection, peer monitoring
also increases the effectiveness of borrowing. Within one group, members tend to monitor and
influence each other’s activity choice so as to keep the entire group at a specific safety level to
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avoid defaults. Consequently, peer pressure may prevent some members from conducting risky
projects or leading unhealthy, costly lifestyles. Unlike the case of individual lending, costs of
defaults are not solely borne by the financial institutions; instead all members in the group are
responsible for risks. In summary, due to asymmetrical information, financial institutions have
great difficulty obtaining information on borrowers’ characteristics, credit history, and how risky
the activities are for which the loan will be used. However, borrowers in the same group
normally know one another and have much easier access to each other’s information, which may
make peer selection and peer monitoring more effective (Morduch, 1999).
The second mechanism of MF programs is dynamic incentives. In most MF programs,
small amounts of loans are provided to borrowers initially. Once loans are repaid on time within
a week or a month, the loan size will increase in the next period. If they are not repaid on time,
no more loans will be lent in the future. In this way, MF programs are able to screen out risky
borrowers in the early stage before potential defaults take place, thereby to some extent solving
the asymmetrical information problem. Such incentives may have greater influences when clients
hope to receive greater amount of loans and can predict how large the loan size will be the next
borrowing period (Morduch, 1999).
Regular repayment schedules are the third mechanism of MF program. Most
microfinance contracts require repayments to start almost right after disbursement. For instance,
the GB has the policy that “terms for a year-long loan are likely to be determined by adding up
the principal and interest due in total, dividing by 50, and starting weekly collections a couple of
weeks after the disbursement” (Morduch, 1999). Similar to the benefits brought by dynamic
incentives, regular repayment schedules can help screen out risky borrowers and allow group
members to find out potential financial problems earlier. In addition, since repayments begin
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before a certain project for which a borrower uses the loan receives any profit, regular repayment
schedules, particularly weekly repayments as the Grameen-example, seem to force borrowers to
secure an additional income source.

ii) Clients and Providers of Microfinance
Typically, MF clients are poor and low-income people who do not have access to the
formal financial institutions. By poverty level, they can be categorized as vulnerable non-poor,
upper poor, poor and very poor. Most of them are self-employed, household-based entrepreneurs,
operating small businesses. Those living in rural areas often conduct small-income-generating
activities including farming, knitting and food processing. In 2008, there were still 1,289 million
of people (22.4% of the world population) worldwide living on less than USD1.25 a day, even
though this figure fell down from 1,909 million in 1990 (The World Bank, 2013b). We can see
that there is a great demand for MF programs so that the poor people can afford daily food
consumption, education fees, medical expenses and even finance needed for small business
operations. As mentioned in Rutherford’s book, The Poor and Their Money (2001), there are
three main categories of events that may cause the poor spending more money than what they
actually have: life-cycle events (birth, marriage, holiday spending, etc.), emergencies (sickness,
unemployment and natural disasters etc.), and investment opportunities (investments in
businesses, land or household assets).
Women comprise a large proportion of MF clients. In the GB, for instance, the
membership was 94% women in 1991-92 (Morduch, 1999), and from 2007 to 2011 the percent
even rose to 96% or greater (Grameen Bank, 2013). The reasons for such great women
involvement are due to the facts that by observation women seem more reliable than men in
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terms of repayments, and that women generally have lower mobility, thereby in a sense avoiding
the ex post moral hazard problem, i.e. “take the money and run” (Morduch, 1999).
Financial service providers that serve poor and low-income clients can be categorized in
four general types: informal financial service provides, member-based organizations,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and formal financial institutions (Helms, 2006).
First of all, informal financial service providers include individual informal providers
(friends and family, moneylenders, and traders) and collective clubs or associations (rotating
savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) and accumulating savings and credit associations
(ASCAs)). Sometimes, it is easier and quicker to simply borrow money from friends and family
and it may be interest-free. Moneylenders, with the bad reputation of charging high costs and
exploiting poor people are perhaps the most well-known. In rural areas where people’s livings
rely on agriculture, traders, processors and input suppliers are important credit providers so that
farmers can obtain advance payments to cover input costs. ROSCAs consist groups of
participates who make regular contributions to a central “pot”, which can be offered to each
contributor by rotation or lottery, while in ASCAs some participants borrow and some do not so
the pot grows over time (Helms, 2006).
Second, one typical example of member-based organizations is credit unions (also called
as savings and credit cooperatives), which generally rely on the members’ own saving as the
primary source of funds. These financial cooperatives are owned and managed by their own
members and are normally not for profit. The financial services provided include savings,
checking accounts, loans, insurances and fund transfer services (Helms, 2006).
Third, NGOs are considered as the true pioneers of microfinance, and international
networks play an important role in establishing and supporting these NGOs. However, they
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encounter numerous development constraints, as it is illegal for them to mobilize savings in
general, and most of them rely on donor funds, thereby not guaranteeing financial sustainability
in the long run. In order to be more sustainable, some NGOs have chosen to operate in a
“commercial” way, indicating that they become independent from donors and obtain commercial
sources of funds to grow and reach more clients. One concern about this commercialization is
“mission drift”, i.e. the worry that the NGOs may deviate from their original mission of serving
the poor, because wealthier clients may be more preferred than poorer ones. Nevertheless, we
should notice that it is possible to be able to reach the poor and be profitable at the same time.
For instance, 139 out of 231 institutions were found profitable in 2003 and 41 out of those 139
that targeted the poorest clients were more profitable on average than all 139 combined (Helms,
2006).
Last but not least, formal financial institutions also provide financial services to the poor
and the low-income, either on their own or through partnership with other financial service
providers such as NGOs. Examples of formal financial institutions are state-owned banks (such
as postal banks), rural banks, specialized microfinance banks, and full-service commercial banks
(Helms, 2006).
According to the Microcredit Summit Campaign (2013), by the end of 2011 there were
3,703 reported microfinance institutions (MFIs; most of them are NGOs) that have reached more
than 195 million clients (over 75% female clients) with current loans, and around 124 million of
these clients were among the poorest when they first joined MF programs. With over 66% of the
world’s population living on less than USD 1.25 a day, Asia possesses about 89% of the poorest
clients. By the end of 2011, there were 1,751 reported MFIs (47% of the total) in Asia and nearly
155 million clients (almost 80% of the total). The updated 2012 data show that 22 countries in
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Asia possess microfinance sectors with 58.5 million borrowers and 34.13 million depositors. The
total loans and deposits in 2012 were USD 39.16 and 32.55 billion, respectively (Samarapally,
2013). With a greatest number of microfinance clients and providers, MF programs in Asia have
drawn lots of attention. However, the current Asian microfinance sector has only succeeded in
fulfilling a very small proportion of the total demand for microfinance services.

iii) Why Studying Microfinance in China?
Among all the Asia countries that have established MF programs, China has much less
sustainable microfinance relative to its population size, and its potential demand is unmatched
with its supply (Helms, 2006). As the most populous country in the world with a large rural
population, there exits a huge demand for microfinance and a great potential to develop the MF
market. In China, government agencies or government-sponsored programs are the key suppliers
of MF services. It may be the result of extensive historic government involvement in the
financial sector (Helms, 2006). However, the subsidized loan program offered by the central
government has not successfully reached the poor and achieved low repayment rates. Formal
financial institutions are not performing very promisingly either. The Agriculture Bank of China
(ABC), one of China’s four state-owned specialized banks, used to supply poverty reduction
funds in the rural areas. Nonetheless, the number of its branches has shrunk significantly since
1995, and the ABC became commercialized and shifted its services from the rural to urban areas.
The Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs) are currently the primary microfinance providers in the
rural China, but most of them are not financially or operationally sustainable and have not
reached the real poor. NGO-MFIs play an indispensable role in supplying microfinance in the
rural areas and reaching the real poor, because they are smaller-scale and locally based. But, as
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the current financial regulations forbid NGO-MFIs from taking deposits from clients, they have
to highly depend on donors’ funds to maintain regular operations and loan mobility. Such donor
dependence restricts the expansion of NGO-MFIs and adversely affects its sustainability. The
thesis will explore these problems and suggest some possible solutions in the last chapter.

iv) Why Choosing Bangladesh and Indonesia to Compare with China?
Bangladesh and Indonesia are considered as the MF giants in Asia (Helms, 2006), both of
which have achieved great success in providing microfinance to the poor and low-income
individuals. Mohammad Yunus established the Grameen Bank (GB) in Bangladesh in the mid1970s, which brought the “microfinance” concept to the entire world through its remarkable
success. When microfinance was first initiated in China in the early 1990s, a large number of MF
programs adopted the GB model (with certain modifications in some cases), either because they
admired the GB’s success and wish to duplicate it, or because there were no other models that
they could potentially follow. Hence, it is important to understand how the GB model works
before analyzing the MF situation in China. In addition, its two NGO-MFIs, Bangladesh Rural
Advancement Committee (BRAC) and Association for Social Advancement (ASA), have shown
great progress, which may inspire the development NGO-MFIs in China in some ways.
Indonesia, on the other hand, has valuable experience in developing its government-sponsored
MF programs, from which China can extract some essence and potentially apply to its own staterun programs.

v) The Organization of The Thesis
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Chapter II will discuss some successful MF programs in Bangladesh and Indonesia, in
which the Grameen Bank will be essentially emphasized. In Chapter III, through the detailed
discussions of MF clients and suppliers in China, the development of microfinance in China will
be demonstrated. The existing challenges that the MF suppliers are facing will also be covered.
At the end of Chapter III, there will be a subsection specifically illustrating the regulatory
environment in China for microfinance with the emphasis that the policies and regulations are
not very favorable to the development of NGO-MFIs. Chapter IV will discuss two NGO-MFIs in
China, the first of which is comparably successful while the second of which is not. The final
chapter, Chapter V, will summarize and analyze several significant difficulties and challenges
regarding the microfinance in China. By associating what can be learned from microfinance in
Bangladesh and Indonesia based on Chapter II with China’s unique characteristics, possible
improvements of microfinance in China will be suggested.
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CHAPTER II: MICROFIANCE IN BANGLADESH AND INDONESIA
i) Bangladesh
As the pioneer adopter of microfinance in the world, Bangladesh has achieved
remarkable success in developing MF models, targeting poor clients and service diversification
(Rahman et al., 2012). In 2009, the rural population almost comprised nearly 75% of the total
population, and one out of two people still lived below the poverty line with less than USD1 a
day (Bangladesh Microfinance Industry Report, 2009). In 2011, there were 20.9 million active
borrowers in Bangladesh and the total micro-loans reached USD2.8 billion. There were also 18.5
million depositors with USD2.2 billion deposits (MixMarket – Bangladesh, 2013). The
microfinance service providers (MSPs) in Bangladesh are mostly financially and operationally
sustainable, as they receive funds from diverse sources, including local banks, international
donor grants, savings of members, loan interests, and service charges (Rahman et al., 2012).
Even though throughout the years more and more MSPs have been less dependent on external
donor grants, they still run profitably. Grameen Bank, Bangladesh Rural Advancement
Committee (BRAC) and Association for Social Advancement (ASA) are great examples to
illustrate the microfinance success in Bangladesh.

1) The Grameen Bank (GB)
Initiated by Mohammad Yunus in 1976, the GB was originally an action research in a
Bangladeshi village. In 1983, it became a formal, specialized bank for the poor under
government legislations (Latifee, 2006 and Rahman et al., 2012). The GB is the only bank with a
poverty alleviation bank license issued by the Bangladesh Bank and it remains as a member-
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owned, self-regulating bank. At present, borrowers own 95% of its total equity, and the
remaining 5% is in the government’s hand (Grameen Bank, 2013).
The fundamental features of the GB model are as following (Grameen Bank, 2013 and
Morduch, 1999):
1) Strict eligibility criteria are applied to target the poorest of the poor and women have
priorities to join;
2) GB staff goes to clients’ homes instead of clients coming to them;
3) Loans are lent to poor households in groups, which are normally formed voluntarily;
and each group typically consists of five members;
4) Collaterals are not required. Lending basically takes place in sequence within groups,
so if one member defaults, there will be no subsequent loans offered to other members;
5) Small loans are repaid in weekly installments and some loan are allowed to be paid
back monthly;
6) There is no joint liability, which means no members are responsible for paying back
loans on behalf of anyone who defaults;
7) Group members and the bank staff together supervise credits.
Moreover, the GB provides a wide variety of financial services, including housing loans,
micro-enterprise loans, savings, insurance products and pension funds, etc. There are also
education schemes for children and a so-called Struggling Members Program for beggars
(Rahman et al., 2012). More impressively, GB is able to offer custom-made credit to clients, so
that the staff has the freedom to create loan products that suit clients’ needs (Latifee, 2006).
There are four interest rates for loans offered by GB: 20%, 8%, 5% and 0% for income
generating loans, housing loans, student loans and Struggling Members (i.e. beggars),
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respectively. Rates for deposits are attractive as well, the minimum and the maximum of which
are 8.5% and 12% (Grameen Bank, 2013).
The number of members as well as the amounts of loans and deposits at the GB has been
growing all the time since its establishment (Table 1 and Figure 1). The most recent statistics
show that in 2011 GB had 2,565 branches in 81,339 villages with 22,124 staff members
(Grameen Bank, 2013). In the past 20 years, GB has been gradually diminishing its dependence
on funds from donors, reflected by its increasing deposit to loan ratio (Figure 2). The GB is a
profitable organization and it has had net profits every year except 1983, 1991 and 1992
(Grameen Bank, 2013). Its operational self-sufficiency (OSS), which refers to the ability of an
institution to generate enough revenues to cover its operating costs, was 102.6% in 2009
(Rahman et al., 2012).
The GB has made a great difference in the lives of its members. One study shows that the
GB borrowers move out of poverty at a rate of 5% per year. It has also empowered its female
members in various ways, including enhancing their respect from spouses, self-confidence and
capacity to solve social issues (Latifee, 2006).

2) Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and Association for Social
Advancement (ASA)
BRAC is a development organization and the largest and fast-growing NGO in the world,
with the aim for poverty alleviation, providing health, education and economic support to
disadvantaged people in rural areas. Launched in 1974, its microfinance program offers a wide
range of financial services to all 64 districts in Bangladesh now. Through its village
organizations (VOs) that consist 30-40 people, mostly women, BRAC brings collateral-free
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loans (from USD100-1000) and saving services to its clients. The VOs can be regarded as a
platform to implement BRAC’s activities and allow women to discuss issues and share
information. Microenterprise loans are also provided to small enterprise owners, supporting and
expanding their businesses (Rahman et al., 2012 and BRAC, 2013). BRAC disburses about
USD1 billion a year and the money earned from the disbursements to the poor covers 80% of its
operation costs (The Economist, 2010).
As one of the largest NGO-MFIs, ASA was established in 1978 and became formally
registered with the government one year after. Its microfinance approach is globally renowned as
“ASA Cost-effective Sustainable Microfinance Model”. Many MFIs around the world that
adopted this model became sustainable within a short time. Based on its model, ASA has a lean
structure, faster recruitment and costless informal training, maximum utilizations of fund, and
innovative management. Branch managers can make decision on all activities as long as they
conform to ASA’s Operation Manual, which serves as one of the facilitators for ASA’s
efficiency. There are no accountants or cashiers in branch offices; instead, loan officers maintain
daily accounts and the branch managers maintain transactional accounts. Branches prepare their
own annual work plan with fiscal targets and cash flow projection, and decide how much to
spend on daily accounts based on calculations. Such policies allow branches to operate smoothly
and efficiently under branch managers’ administration, and district and regional managers only
perform as supervisors rather than decision makers.
ASA offers two types of collateral-free loans to the poor and low-income clients. The
first type is “Primary Loan” offered to the economically active poor, which has a maximum
tenure of 12 months with a loan ceiling of USD650, while the other one is “Special Loan”
offered to owners of small or micro-enterprises, which has a maximum tenure of 30 months and
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has the range between USD662 and USD6500. Both loans have flexible repayment schedules
and the maximum of their interest rate is 27%. At the end of 2011, there were 3,154 ASA
branches in Bangladesh serving more than 4.94 million clients. The disbursement for both loans
was about USD1,080.80 million and the savings of its clients were around USD167.77 million.
The data in June 2012 show that ASA had the repayment rate as high as 99.67%, and its OSS
was 209.72% (ASA, 2013).

3) Microfinance Regulations in Bangladesh
Bangladesh is working towards building its microfinance regulations by a separated
regulatory authority. In 1991, the NGO Affairs Bureau (NGOAB) was created to regulate NGO
registration, approve project proposals, release funds and monitor projects, ensuring transparency
and accountability of NGOs supported by foreign funds. Since the establishment of Microcredit
Regulatory Authority (MRA) and the MRA Act 2006, MSPs in Bangladesh started being
regulated. MRA is responsible for providing/cancel licenses and monitor MSPs’ performance.
All MSPs are required to register with MRA to be able to provide MF services legally. One
exception is that the GB, the only bank in Bangladesh with a license to operate as a specialized
bank for microfinance, is regulated by Bangladesh Bank, the central bank of the countryk
(Rahman et al., 2012 and Bangladesh Microfinance Industry Report, 2009).

ii) Indonesia
Since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Indonesia has promoted any “pro-poor” growth
strategies, one of which is microfinance (Miyashita, 2000). According to the 2011 statistics,
there were more than 460,000 active borrowers in Indonesia and the total micro-loans reached
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USD10.1 billion. There were also over 275,000 depositors with USD73.5 million deposits
(MixMarket – Indonesia, 2013). Although its MF scale is not as large as that in Bangladesh,
impressively Indonesia has achieved great success in government-sponsored MF programs,
which have been delivering financial services to the poor and the low-income in both costeffective and profitable ways (Miyashita, 2000).

1) Government-Sponsored Microfinance Programs
The unit desa1 system of Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI-UD) and Badan Kredit Desa
(BKD) are the examples of government-sponsored microfinance programs that perform as the
national- and village-level financial institutions, respectively.
Established in 1970 as a part of the state-owned BRI, BRI-UD was initially a channeling
agent for targeting and subsidizing government loans. Due to the Indonesian government’s first
major financial deregulation package in 1983, BRI-UD became a large state-owned commercial
bank, increasing financial service availability for the poor and the low-income. Its BRI-UD has a
single loan product with an effective annual interest rate of 32%, which is much lower than that
charged by local moneylenders but higher than the market rates. This can enable the real poor
have access to credits at lower costs, as they used to borrow from moneylenders, and meanwhile
it helps exclude wealthier borrowers who can actually receive loans from the conventional
financial sector. Locally mobilized savings finance all the loans at BRI-UD, which partially
explains the unit desa system’s profitability since 1986 and independence on subsidy since 1987.
The repayment rate related to this loan product has been very high too. Even during the 1997
financial crisis, BRI-UD still enjoyed its growth, remaining stable and profitable. One of the
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  “Desa” in Indonesia means “village”.	
  
	
  

21	
  

reasons is that BRI-UD understands the local markets and provides suitable financial services to
clients based on their needs. The staff is well trained about the markets and microfinance
operations, and staff incentives such as performance-based cash awards also motivate them to
perform as bankers and deliver the best services to clients (Miyashita, 2000 and Robinson, 2003).
In addition to BRI-UD, there are also small-scale MF programs sponsored by the
provincial or village governments. Although compared with BRI-UD they have smaller loans
and deposits, higher interest rates, and higher operation costs, they in fact help fill gaps in the
BRI-UD network by reaching more poor clients in the remote regions. Supervised by BRI, BKD
is such a village-owned example, known as the world’s oldest commercial microfinance
institution. Unlike BRI-UD that is located at the sub-district level, serving the surrounding
villages, the BKD units operate at the village level, reaching deeper in their own villages. Each
BKD unit provides short-term, weekly-repaid loans and voluntary saving services to its clients
within its corresponding village. Individual loans are offered without collaterals as well
(Miyashita, 2000 and Robinson, 2003).
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CHAPTER III: THE DEVELOPMENT OF MICROFINANCE IN CHINA
As the most populous country in the world, China had the population of 1.34 billion and
with its GDP growth rate being 9.3% in 2011 (The World Bank, 2013a). Although the standard
of living improves all the time, until 2008 there was still 13.1% of the population in China living
with merely USD1.25 per day (The World Bank, 2013a), and the most recent statistics from the
State Statistics Bureau (2011) show that there were over 122 million rural people living below
the national poverty line2, which was set at RMB 2,300 (USD 366). Microfinance was initiated
in China in the early 1990s with the goal of alleviating poverty mainly in the rural areas. Since
1996, the Chinese government has regarded microfinance as a potentially effective alternative
for funding the poor (Zhang et al., 2010).

i) Who Demands Microfinance in China?
There are four groups of people in China with very limited access to financial services:
rural households, low-wage workers, micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs),
and unemployed people (Sparreboom and Duflos, 2012).
Rural households, particularly farmers, livestock raisers and fishermen, consist of the
largest group in China that has difficulty obtaining financial services. According to the most
recent 2010 population census, there were 674 million rural residents living in over 200 million
rural households (Sparreboom and Duflos, 2012). Although some data show that approximately
31% of all the rural population was able to receive loans from financial institutions (Bedson,
2009), it is hard to say whether these 31% were the very poor or the poor or the upper poor. The
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
2 Ravallion (2010) defines a poverty line as “the money an individual needs to achieve the minimum level of
‘welfare’ to not be deemed ‘poor’”.	
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conventional financial institutions in China are reluctant to provide credit to the rural population,
because of asymmetrical information, lack of collateral, high costs of lending small loans, and
high risks of defaults. Rural households may only be able to provide houses, labor, or machinery
as collaterals; however, they are either non-physical, like labor, or worth too little, like
machinery. Moreover, rural population highly depends on agriculture, which is influenced by
natural conditions, making their incomes unpredictable and unstable (Zhou and Takeuchi, 2010).
Due to the fact that personal relationships are easily developed in small rural communities,
which makes the problem of asymmetrical information less severe, informal lenders such as
pawn brokers and moneylenders can provide credit to rural population, but with rather high
interest rates. Such high interest rates hinder poor rural households to obtain any loans. As a
matter of fact, informal lenders do not have the government’s approval and most of them operate
illegally. Hence, we can see that there is a great demand for reliable and cheaper microfinance,
which consequently leads to the great potential for the rural MF market. Conducted in 2005, a
survey of 502 rural households in four counties/cities in Guizhou Province, located in the
southwest of China, show that 89% of the interviewed households expressed their interests in
obtaining credit (He, 2008). Another survey conducted in Zhejiang Province and Ningxia
Autonomous Region in 2003 implies that with appropriate technical training provided, more
households were willing to receive loans (He, 2008). As in China poverty is a rural phenomenon,
caused by the limited rural-urban migration (Wang et al., 2004), microfinance provided to rural
households in China is the emphasis of the thesis. The following paragraph will briefly discuss
the other three groups that demand microfinance.
The second largest group is low-wage workers, including rural migrant workers.
Although they leave their rural homes and work in towns or urban areas, with little amount of
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income they may not have collaterals and are still considered risky by the formal credit sector.
Rural migrant workers may also find difficult to open a bank account or obtain a loan, as they do
not have residence status in the town/city where they currently live and work. The third group is
MSMEs that are smaller-scale and riskier businesses, compared with the large, state-owned
companies. MSEMs often need finance for start-ups, expansions, and innovations, etc. There are
a large number of MSMEs in China and this number keeps increasing rapidly. Shown by the
statistics at the end of June 2007, there were more than 42 million legally registered MSMEs,
accounting for 99.8% of the total number of enterprises in China (He, 2008). As it is uncertain
whether they can make a profit or loss in the near future, formal financial institutions are less
willing to offer loans to MSMEs. The last group is the unemployed workers including lay-off
workers from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and rural job seekers in urban areas. Due to the
reform of SOEs in China, lots of workers in poorly managed, inefficient, and wasteful SOEs
were laid off. In addition to that, it takes considerable amount of time for rural people to find
jobs in urban areas, because they are less educated and secured. Hence, in order to meet basic
living needs, they demand credit as well.

ii)

Who Supplies the Rural Credit in China?
There are four primary rural credit providers in China: informal lenders, government

agencies, formal financial institutions, and NGO-MFIs. They have different impacts on the poor
and the low-income.
Jointly cooperating with state-owned financial institutions such as the People’s Bank of
China (PBC), i.e. the central bank in China, and the Agriculture Bank of China (ABC),
government agencies provide microfinance through the government poverty reduction program.
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One example is the “8-7 Plan” introduced in 1994, i.e. National Plan for Poverty Reduction,
whose ultimate objective was to “lift the majority of the remaining 80 million poor above the
government’s poverty line during the seven year period 1994-2000” (Wang et al., 2004). Out of
the three focused programs of the 8-7 Plan, the subsidized loans program3 used over 50% of total
poverty funds, which were RMB 113 billion in total (USD13.6 billion) from 1994 to 2000
(Wang et al., 2004). The aim of this program was to directly support economic development of
poor areas and households, and loans were only used for investment. The PBC allocated
subsidized loans to the provincial ABCs, which in turn passed on the loans to the county-level
ABCs. The government allocated some of the subsidized loan funds to MF activities, applying
the GB approach with variations. The interest rate was charged at 2.88%, which was far lower
than the market interest rate, 8-10% (Park, 2001). However, the subsidized loan program was
found not reaching the poor and achieving low repayment rates, which were as low as 50%
(Park, 2001). This was partly because the program’s objectives of reaching the poor and
enhancing economic development conflicted with one another. More loans were in fact offered
to enterprises and richer households, because they could bring more financial benefits. Several
other factors contributed to its poor performance: 1) procedures for loan application and approval
were complicated; 2) physical collateral was required by the ABC that excluded some poor
households; 3) due to high repayment risk, there was less incentive for the ABC or local
governments4 to lend to the poor; 4) lack of knowledge and experience in credit management and
the bureaucratic model of welfare delivery were two of reasons for the low repayment rate; 5)
because of political or social concerns, the government tended to forgive defaults, which led to
disincentives of borrowers to repay future loans (Wang et al., 2004 and Zhang et al., 2010).
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
3	
  The subsidized loan program was in fact dated back to 1986. The other two programs were food-for-work program
and government budgetary grants. 	
  
4 Since 1998, the repayment risk was passed from ABC to local governments.	
  
	
  
26	
  

State-owned formal financial institutions play an important role of providing
microfinance in rural areas, such as the ABC, Agriculture Development Bank of China (ADBC),
Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs), and Village/Township Banks (VTBs) etc. The ABC is one of
China’s four state-owned specialized banks, founded in 1979 to provide poverty reduction funds
in rural areas. However, since 1995 the size of ABC has been shrinking every year, from 67,092
branches in 1995 to 23,461 at present (He, 2008 and ABC, 2013). This is mainly because of its
transition toward a more commercial-based lending model, which has caused the ABC gradually
shifting its services from rural to urban areas and focusing more on large, state-owned, and more
profitable enterprises (Guo, 2009).
Located at the township level, the RCCs have been the dominant financial institution in
rural areas since the mid-1990s when they ceased affiliation with the ABC and started being
regulated and supervised by the PBC. During that period of time, the RCCs had problems
regarding nonperforming loans (NPLs) and financial losses, which triggered the PBC to launch
several reforms in order to make RCCs more sustainable and regulated. One of such reforms was
to introduce a MF program, through which rural households could have access to loans coming
from agriculture lending of the PBC. The interest rate was affordable for the rural poor, but
below the rate that ensured cost recovery for most RCCs. In this MF program, loans are small in
amount and short in time, and there are no loan repayments in installments and gender targeting
required. Basically, the credit rating staff is responsible for assessing the credit ratings of rural
households with the help of village officials in some ways. This implies RCCs focus on
providing rural credit more widely rather than targeting the poor. Once approved qualified, rural
households will receive a credit certificate with a specific credit limit, then they can obtain loans
from RCCs with the certificate up to that limit (Xie, 2003).
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Although RCCs have “cooperative” in its name, in fact they are not real cooperatives. A
cooperative is “a nonprofit democratic organization created voluntarily by members with a
common goal”, and members should be able to take part in the decision-making process, and
share profits and risks (Xie, 2003). The reality is that RCCs are not very democratic, as under
most situations local governments and officials make the final, important decisions, and
members are not fully informed of RCCs’ financial conditions. Furthermore, instead of
maximizing members’ benefits, RCCs seem to seek profits, which may make them reluctant to
lend loans to the real poor. One 2002 study shows that among about 900 rural households in
three chosen provinces, only 16% of borrowed from RCCs (Zhou and Takeuchi, 2010). Also,
there are moral hazard problems involved due to soft budget constraints and implicit deposit
insurance offered to RCCs. As the primarily important vehicle for the government to provide
credit in rural areas, RCCs are bailed out by the PBC once they face financial difficulties,
implying that RCCs would never go bankrupt. This fact diminishes RCCs’ incentives to operate
efficiently (Xie, 2003). In 2003, there was another reform initiated by the PBC and China
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in 7 provinces, with the objective of clarifying RCCs’
ownership structure, strengthening their corporate governance, and transferring administrative
responsibilities to provincial governments, all of which could help solve the problems discussed
above to some extent and allow RCCs to be more operationally and financially sustainable. Due
to the positive impact, 21 more provinces were covered in the following year.
NGO-MFIs that sometimes cooperate with international organizations also provide a
substantial amount of microfinance in rural areas. One of the most important NGO-MFI players
in China is the Funding the Poor Cooperatives (FPC), the first MF organization in China, whose
four branches mainly provide MF services to farmers in Hebei and Henan provinces. The Rural
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Development Institute (RDI) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) initiated FPC
in 1993. Although it has received funds and subsidized loans from the Ford Foundation,
Grameen Trust, and Citigroup etc., FPC strives to achieve financial sustainability. Basically, it is
a Grameen replication program that started as a pilot project so as to explore a new poverty
alleviation approach. Table 2 gives a performance overview of its four branches. FPC has
delivered the loans of more than RMB 100 million, which have helped over 30,000 households.
Impressively, FPC’s repayment rate remains over 95% (FPC, 2013). FPC is considered as a
milestone in China’s MF development and a successful MF program that follows the Grameen
Bank (GB) model.
Another NGO-MIF example is the Microfinance Department under the China Foundation
for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA), which is one of the largest NGO-MFIs in China. CFPA is
committed to helping the low-income, especially women, in poor areas with access to basic
social services. Established in 1996, the Microfinance Group provides small loans as well as
practical training and information workshops for its clients. In 2008, the Microfinance
Department was transformed into CFPA Microfinance Management Co., Ltd, i.e. CFPA
Microfinance, and was responsible for implementing and managing microfinance pilot projects.
By the end of February 2013, there were 138,602 active clients, RMB 939 millions of loans
outstanding and in total RMB 4 billion of loans disbursed. With 66 branches, it covered 14
provinces, 66 counties and more than 18,000 villages. Possessing some similar features of the
GB model, CFPA offers loans of up to RMB 12,000 for a single loan to a group of five with no
collateral required. The loan period is from 6 to 12 months loans are repaid monthly (CFPA
Microfinance, 2013). Statistics in 2011 show that 99% of CFPA’s clients were farmers; 91% of

	
  

29	
  

clients were women; 68% of loans were used for farming and animal breeding (CFPA, 2011). In
addition, free agricultural technical training and financial education were provided to farmers.
Similar to the two examples above, most of the NGO-MFIs in China adopted the GB
model. Compared with the formal financial institutions, NGO-MFIs normally reach more very
poor households in very poor and remote rural areas, because their projects sites are often located
in “the nationally-designated or provincially-designated poverty counties in remote centralwestern mountainous areas, where the very poor and minorities concentrate” (Zhang et al.,
2010). Although some MF programs such as FPC have certain eligibility criteria, some studies
have found that these programs tended to provide services to an increasing number of middle and
above-middle income households (Zhang et al., 2010). This may be because some loan officers
choose to exclude those very poor households who have greater risks in order to achieve high
repayment rates as well as operational and financial sustainability. At the same time, those very
poor individuals may also exclude themselves, as they do not think they can repay loans.
Furthermore, another significant challenge that NGO-MIFs encounter is their lack of national
scope. For instance, the four FPC branches only cover two Chinese provinces. In China, the
expansion potential of NGO-MFIs is very limited because they are not legal financial institutions
and do not have corporate status, which results in their inability to mobilize deposits or obtain
loans. Hence, some of these NGO programs are attempting to transform into MF companies or
become project offices under a local government of development association (PlaNet Finance,
2013).
Two small-scale, NGO MF programs will be particularly studied in Chapter IV in order
to demonstrate the challenges and difficulties the NGO-MFIs in China have been facing in
general.
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iii)

The Regulatory Environment for Microfinance in China
Before we move on to Chapter IV, let us first take a look at what the regulatory

environment in China for microfinance, supplied by both formal financial institutions and NGOMFIs, is like.
The PBC and the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) are two important
banking regulators in China. They are responsible for promulgating policies and providing
guidelines to regulate the MF market in China. RCCs, the primary supplier of financial services
to the poor and low-income households in rural areas, were under the ABC’s regulations prior to
1996. With the Decision of the State Council on Rural Financial Institutional reforms announced
in 1996, the PBC replaced the ABC and started supervising RCCs. Three years later, the PBC
issued the Provisional Method of Microcredit Loans Management of RCCs for Rural
Households, which states that the management methods of microcredit loans should be “once
approval, lend when need, balance control, revolving use”. Loan conditions and standards of
credit assessment were included as well. In 2000, the Guidance on Group Loans Management of
RCCs for Rural Households was put forward to clarify a set of RCC policies regarding group
guarantee, compulsory savings and installment payment etc. (He et al., 2009). In 2003, the
CBRC took over the supervision of RCCs (Du, 2005). More guidelines were issued for other
formal financial institutions. In 2007, Guideline on How to Greatly Develop Rural Microloan
Business by Banking Financial Institutions promulgated by the CBRC was the first regulatory
document that summarizes the unified guidance on MF businesses provided by formal financial
institutions, including provincial RCC Unions, rural cooperative banks, and state-owned
commercial banks etc. (He et al., 2009).

	
  

31	
  

NGO-MFIs are not as regulated as the formal financial institutions. According to China’s
financial laws and regulations, it is illegal for non-financial institutions including NGOs to
supply any financial services. Having received written approval from the State Council and the
PBC, only FPC, the Supporting Service Centre of the Poor (SSCOP), and Chinese International
Center for Economic and Technical Exchanges (CICETE) that works cooperatively with UNDP,
are considered legal organizations to conduct MF activities (Zhang et al., 2010), which means
theoretically other NGOs are illegal. Due to these NGOs’ important role in alleviating poverty, in
fact the PBC and the CBRC silently permit NGOs to supply MF services (Du, 2005). Without a
clear legal status, NGOs are often subject to “changing political factors and local government’s
interference” (Zhang et al., 2010). In addition, organizations that have more than RMB 8 billion
(USD 965.5 million) of annual assets and RMB 3 billion (USD 362.1 million) of net assets in the
previous year are qualified to apply to be MF companies, which are regulated by the PBC and
can only supply financial services to member enterprises (Du, 2005). Due to such strict licensing
and client requirements, MF organizations usually find unqualified or infeasible to transform into
MF companies.
The government regulations cover three main areas: financing, interest rates and taxation.
Regarding financing, formal financial institutions mainly receive funds from deposits, fiscal
funds, international grants and the PBC’s refinancing facility. Grants from international donors
are the key source of funding for NGO-MFIs, and they cannot take deposits or receive financial
support from the PBC, which implies that they normally have less ample, continuous and stable
financing sources. In the case of interest rates, the PBC determines the ceiling of deposit interest
rates and the minimum interest rates of loans for commercial banks. RCCs can have loan interest
rates floating 0.9-2.2 times around the base interest rate. The interest rates charged by NGO-
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MFIs vary between different institutions, but under certain situations these rates are higher than
the PBC’s base interest rate, which is in fact not permitted by the laws. Regarding taxation,
RRCs are subject to operating taxes and added operating taxes but are exempt from income tax.
The government has not set clear taxation policies for NGO-MFIs; however, some local
governments may levy taxes on their microfinance operations, which to some extent deepen their
financial burden (Du, 2005).
Based on the facts above, we can see that the Chinese government ought to put forwards
specific regulations that can stimulate and supervise the development of NGO-MFIs.
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CHAPTER IV: TWO NGO MICROFINANCE CASE STUDIES IN CHINA
i)

Yushi Mao and His Microfinance Program
Economist Yushi Mao is a pioneer in microfinance and poverty alleviation programs. He

initiated a MF pilot project in 1993 with RMB 500 (USD 86) in Longshuikou Village of
Tuanshuikou Town, located in Lin County, Shanxi Province. Primarily targeting rural farmer
households, this small-scale MF program followed some features of the GB model but there
were some modifications as well so as to reflect China’s specific characteristics. For instance, he
did not adopt the 5-individual lending practice, as defaults would harm one’s reputation in rural
China where people tend to know everyone in small villages (Fuping Development Institute,
2013 and Chinese Business Reviews, 2006). Mao established strict policies when this MF
program just started operating. According to the policies, there were two types of loans. The first
type was interest-free, and could be used for the purpose of disease treatment and education with
one-year loan period. The program staff would verify such uses of loans before loans were
offered. The other type of loans was primarily used for production purpose, including purchasing
fertilizers and operating micro-enterprises, with six-month loan period, and its annual interest
rate was12.68% and 21%, respectively, before and after the year of 2009 (Bai, 2011). By the end
of 2012, 190 million of loans were disbursed and more than 3,000 households have benefited
from the microfinance programs (Fuping Development Institute, 2013 and Chinese Business
Reviews, 2006).
With his personal influence, Mao was able to obtain funds from private donors as well as
domestic and international organizations at the interest rate of 6%. However, donors were the
individuals who had the ownership of the funds so that they could cease donations at any time if
they wanted to do so. Having realized that the program could not rely on donations all the time,
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Mao encouraged deposits from the clients. The deposit interest rate was set at 6% initially, but in
order to reduce operation costs it fell to 3% later on (Chinese Business Reviews, 2006). Gladly,
this decrease in the deposit interest rate did not stop villagers from saving more money, as they
have established a very good relationship with this MF program, which has been helping them
improve their standard of living. Mao also established some good management practices. For
example, for safety unused funds should be kept in banks; one week before repayment the
program staff would remind borrowers of their upcoming repayments, which ensured the smooth
lending operation; and the program was transparent because uses of funds were reported to
borrowers quarterly (Chinese Business Reviews, 2006).
In 2002, Mao co-founded the Fuping Development Institute (FDI), a NGO that focuses on
low-income people in China and has four core operations: microfinance, eco-agriculture, early
education and domestic and community service. Its MF operation is the expansion of the MF
program in Longshuikou Village and more households in three more areas have been reached,
including Yongji, Shanxi province, Dayi, Sichuan province, and Beijing5. With the average loan
size being up to RMB 30,000, FDI MF requires no collateral as well. Similar to the MF program
in Longshuikou Village, other branches are set up in the villages and townships so as to be closer
to clients and provide swift door-to-door services (FDI, 2013). What has been changed is that
with the establishment of FDI, the MF program in Longshuikou Village started providing loans
more to individuals who have the payback ability rather than only to those who are really in
need. According to Mao, the reason for this dramatic shift was because the program ought to be
profitable in order to maintain its normal operation and continuity of loans (Bai, 2011).
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  The program in Beijing is designed to support rural migrant entrepreneurs.	
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Mao with his MF program is a typical case in China. As mentioned earlier, under Chinese
regulations and laws it is illegal for NGO-MFIs to accept deposits and receive sources of funds
from the general public, which can be regarded as a way of “illegal fundraising”. During the
interview with Shen Zhen Special Zone Newspaper, Mao claimed that he did not think that illegal
fundraising being a crime made any sense to him, and admitted that if it was truly a crime he had
definitely broken the law (Zhou, 2012). Even though what he does is illegal, it seems to be the
only way of allowing his MF program to operate smoothly and provide financial services to the
poor in need consistently. Some people also criticized that Mao’s intent was actually to make
profits through his MF program, because compared with the Grameen model, Mao’s MF
program charges higher loan interest rates but lower deposit interest rates. In his own defense, he
explained that the rural population urgently needs accessible credit and his job is to provide this
for them; however, in order to continue its operation the MF program must be profitable (Bai,
2011). Even though his statement seems not that convincing, we cannot omit the substantial
influences that Mao and his MF program have brought to the local rural areas where the program
operates. Undoubtedly, there may be other numerous MF programs at various places in China
that truly consider seeking profits rather than poverty reduction as the target. What China
seriously lacks is to have a robust MF system that can oversee and regulate these currently
unregulated NGO-MFIs.

ii)

Aba-Songpan Grameen Microcredit Co. Ltd in Songpan County, Sichuan Province6
In 2006, after being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, Dr. Muhammad Yunus was invited

to attend the Grameen International Conference on Microcredit in China, organized by Grameen
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  Most of the facts and data in this subsection are based on Niu and Zeng (2012).	
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Trust (GT) and China Association of Microfinance (CAM). During the visit, he expressed his
interest in opening up a “GB” in China. To response to his interest, the PBC offered a license to
him to start BOT projects in China. And the Vice President of the PBC suggested experimenting
in a county in Sichuan Province. Here, a BOT project refers to a “build-operate-transfer project”.
In a BOT project, “the public sector grantor grants a private company the right to develop and
operate a facility or system for a certain period, in what would traditionally be a public sector
project”, and “operator finances, owns and constructs the facility or system and operate it
commercially for the concession period, after which the facility has is transferred to the authority”
(Public Private Partnership, 2013). In our case, the PBC granted the GT the right to develop and
operate a microfinance company for a certain period of time and eventually the PBC or the
central government would take over this program, as long as it was viable.
The GT is an international wholesale fund that supports MF programs at their start-ups
and scaling-up stages, and in difficult situations. It follows the GB model, brings key personnel
from Grameen, recruits local staff and trains them to become professionals in microfinance. The
GT has had the BOT projects operating in several countries, including Myanmar, Turkey,
Zambia and Indonesia. And they are all doing well in terms of reaching the poor and operating
sustainably (Latifee, 2006).
Although initially the experimental site was chosen to be in Wenchuan County, the
project was forced to cease due to the huge earthquake in 2008. One year after, Songpan County
was selected instead to be the new site where the microfinance company, which was later named
as Aba-Songpan Grameen Microcredit Co. Ltd (ASGMCL), could be established. In the same
year, One Foundation and Alibaba Group took part in this project as well. One Foundation was
founded under a partnership with the Red Cross Society of China. In 2010, it was approved to be
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a public welfare foundation in Shenzhen, which has the independent legal status to engage in
public fundraising activities. The other participant, Alibaba Group, is the largest Internet-based
e-commerce business in China. In order to successfully import the Grameen approach to China,
One Foundation invested RMB 5 million, and Alibaba Group invested RMB 0.1 million plus
RMB 6.8 million donated to ASGMCL on behalf of the GT. With these investments, ASGMCL
was able to successfully and formally registered with the government in November 2010.
However, only after two years, the company had to cease its operations. What has happened over
this period of time?
First of all, the clients of ASGMCL were not the very poor, and the ASGMCL staff
selected their clients based on their reputation and credibility instead of their income levels and
financial needs, which differed from the GB model. Another difference is that it usually takes 36 months for the GB staff to find a group of 5 borrowers, as the staff needs to visit lots of
households to identify who are qualified for the MF services, while the staff at ASGMCL chose
a more convenient way by selecting qualified clients from a list of households provided by the
local village officers. As a result, those whose income levels reached or even above the average
in a certain village were able to borrow loans. Even though some households were qualified, they
decided not to obtain loans from ASGMCL, because the repayment period was only one month,
which was too soon for the farming households who had to wait for the harvest season to get
their investments back. This is particularly true in Songpan County, which has scattered
population and relatively short farming season. In addition, ASGMCL charged the interest rate
of 10%, higher than 9% offered by the local credit union when it coordinated a special program
with the ABC. Even if the credit union charged higher after that program was over, rural
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households would probably still choose to go to the credit union, as it offers larger amount of
loans during each borrowing period.
Second, there were cultural barriers between the project manager sent by the GT to China,
and the local staff as well as the local environment. There have been three project managers
coming from Bangladesh to help facilitate the operation of ASGMCL. However, the first two did
not adjust to the local environment very well and got sick, thus returning home instead before
they even fulfilled their duties in China. Because of this management inconsistency, in March
2012, ASGMCL finally distributed the first loans. Before its cessation, there were only 50 clients
receiving loans from ASGMCL, which is part of reason for the ASGMCL’s financial loss. The
total loans disbursed in these 9 months were RMB 0.5 million with interest earnings being RMB
50,000; however, the company’s operation costs were as high as RMB 1 million, implying very
low operational sustainability. Moreover, at the GB it is very competitive to be qualified as a
microfinance staff, who has to come from a local poor family and is required to go through half a
year of training, and there is only probability of 60% to be selected. Staff selection is very crucial,
which directly determines the quality of financial services they will provide in the future.
However, in the ASGMCL case, Mr. Thacker, the last project manager sent by the GT to
Songpan, honestly pointed out that the three staff at ASGMCL was not very qualified, as they
did not receive sufficient training and they who in fact do not live in poorer families got this job
through personal network. Gradually, Thacker started to realize how important a personal
network is in such a small Chinese community.
Last but not least, there were conflicts and distrust between the two large donors and the
management from the GT. As both One Foundation and Alibaba Group invested a big sum of
money in ASGMCL, they were the two most important shareholders who got involved the
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decision-making process during the ASGMCL’s operation. The representative from One
Foundation raised his doubt on the ASGMCL’s business model and claimed that the model
should be modified; otherwise, it was simply waste of money. In addition, he considered there
was something wrong with the financial records managed by the GT, which could be the key
reason for the potential loss. However, after certain investigation, everything looked good and no
personal interests were ever involved.
Some scholars went to Songpan before it ceased operation and concluded that ASGMCL
did not follow the GB model at all but used a traditional Chinese way of borrowing and lending.
Certainly, it is also improper to apply all the GB features in the ASGMCL case (for the summary
of comparison between the classic GB model in Bangladesh and the modified GB model adopted
by ASGMCL, please refer to Table 3), but it is really important to realize that: 1) different types
of microfinance services should be supplied according to clients’ needs, so that more clients
would be attracted to take loans; 2) The selection and training processes for microfinance staff
are very crucial, because to some extent it determines the quality of the services provided,
repayment ability of clients, and sustainability of a specific MF program in the future. Hence, it
would better follow the GB practices regarding this aspect.
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CHAPTER V: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO MICROFINANCE
CHALLENGES IN CHINA
i) What can China learn from Bangladesh?
As the examples of the GB, BRAC and ASA in Bangladesh discussed in Chapter II, there
are several good points that the NGO-MFIs in China should consider learning:
1)

It is very important to reach the poorest of the poor, especially women, to alleviate

poverty effectively. As mentioned earlier, women are more responsible and care more about the
their families and children than men. Some NGO-MFIs in China have a large proportion of
female clients, such as CFPA and ASGMCL discussed in Chapter III and IV, respectively.
Although having a high percentage of female clients may not necessarily guarantee high
repayment rate, but there is ample empirical evidence that has shown it had make a difference.
2)

There should be strict and clear selection criteria designed during the client selection

process. The GB does a good job spending a significant amount time visiting and interviewing
rural households, and then decides whether they are qualified in term of personal characters,
income levels and family conditions etc. ASGMCL in Songpan County simplified the
interviewing process, which did not help form a close lender-borrower relationship initially.
Also, the company did not focus on the real poor households who demanded credit the most.
Although there were no relevant data and analysis available showing whether the economy of the
county has improved or not after ASGMCL operated there, not serving the real poor cannot help
alleviate poverty radically.
3)

Microfinance staff ought to actively bring the MF services to the people in need and

regularly visit the clients to find out whether they encounter any difficulties; if they do the staff
can assist them to sort out, which would help improve repayment rates. It may be costly for the
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formal financial institutions to provide this type of door-to-door services, because some
households who live in remote or mountainous areas are hard to reach. This suggests that more
local branches ought to be built up nearby those hard-to-reach rural areas or some small-scale
NGO-MFIs should be encouraged to start their businesses there.
4)

All the three MF programs in Bangladesh show that the poor are able to utilize loans and

repay them on time as long as effective procedures and provider-client relationships are well
established and maintained. Some RCCs in China still require clients to provide collaterals when
borrowing loans, which may deter a large number of the poor from borrowing. RCCs could
consider put forwards some policies involved dynamic incentives, as mentioned in Chapter I,
such as increasing loan size after each timely repayment, which may be a better approach of
avoiding defaults than requiring any collaterals.
5)

Competition is necessary among MSPs so that a variety of innovative products that

fulfill different clients’ needs can be created. For example, the GB has designed services for
beggars and students, specifically, and Mao’s MF program offers two different types of loans
based on their uses.
6)

MSPs, especially NGO-MFIs should diminish their dependence on donor grants and find

their own ways to be both operationally and financially sustainable. Accepting savings is one of
the good options and the Cost-effective Sustainable Microfinance Model designed by ASA is
worth studying and applying with adaptions.
7)

A well-established, separated regulatory authority is indispensable for the MF sector to

be regulated differently from the conventional financial sector. The Chinese government has a lot
to work on in order to establish a legalized environment for NGO-MFIs.
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ii) What can China learn from Indonesia?
MFIs in China can adopt some of good policies and practices from the governmentsponsored BRI-UD and BKD programs and modify them based on China’s own characteristics:
1)

Experiences from BRI-UD and BKD further confirm that character references can be

regarded as an effective collateral substitute to guarantee repayments. It is also important to
realize this type of non-physical collaterals depend on how important one’s character in his or
her community. Since most of rural microfinance programs in China operate at the village level,
tight relations and social pressure would be able to serve as a good collateral.
2)

Different from the cases in Bangladesh, BRI-UD and BKD charge higher-than-market

interest rates in order to cover operational costs, which allows them to be self-sufficient. In spite
of such high interest rates, there are still a large number of borrowers. This indicates to some
extent, the poor and the low-income think the access to credits more important than high interest
rates. MFIs in China could consider charging higher interest rates, not only to be sustainable and
independent from donor funds, but also to use it as a strategy to screen out wealthier borrowers.
3)

Staff incentives are important to maintain high-quality microfinance services. With

appropriate incentives, either financial or non-financial, staff is more likely to be careful in the
client selection process and establish good relationship with clients, which will largely result in
higher repayment rates. It may not be a good idea to hire all employees on the part-time basis, as
they would have fewer incentives to reach more clients and deliver satisfying services.
4)

The experience that the state-owned BRI-UD supervises the village-based BKD can be

learned by the MFIs in China. Supervision by formal, experienced financial institutions can help
MFIs in various ways, including staff trainings, sources of loans, trust gained from borrowers
and depositors and legal practices, etc.
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APPENDIX: TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1: Grameen Bank Historical Financial Data (Based on the data from
http://www.grameen-info.org/; amount in million USD)
Performance Indicator

1976

1983

1990

2000

2011

Cumulative Loans

0.001

194.95

248.08

3,060.44

11,350

Cumulative Deposits

NA

18.51

25.86

126.78

1,475.03

Number of Members

10

58,320

869,538

2,378,601

8,372,081

Percentage of Female Members 20%

46%

91%

95%

96%

Number of Branches

1

86

781

1160

2565

Profit/Loss

NA

-0.0059

0.0027

0.21

8.59

Figure 1: Grameen Bank - Cumulative Loan
Disbursements (1976-2011)
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Source: Grameen Bank – Bank for the Poor. http://www.grameen.com/
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Figure 2: Grameen Bank- Deposit to Loan Ratio
(1997-2011)
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Table 2: Overview of FPC’s Four Branches (2007) (Based on the information from
http://www.supportmicrofinance.org/en/welcome)
Branch Name Number of Members

Repayment Rate

Percentage of Female Clients

Laishui

1,785

-

100%

Nanzhao

6,283

99%

100%

Yixian

18,406

99%

83%

Yucheng

1,808

-

100%
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Table 3: Comparison Between the Classical GB Model and ASGMCL’s Modified GB
Model (Adapted from Niu and Zeng (2012))
Particular

The GB model in Bangladesh

The GB model in ASGMCL

Clients

Primarily women who are required

Mostly richer households or relatives of

to be very poor

local village officials

Weekly – high frequency

Monthly, starting from the third month

Repayment Schedule

after the initial borrowing
Selection of MF Staff

Better to come from poor families

Tended to have good family
background and strong relationship
with the local government

MF Staff Training

Normally last half a year with

No systematic training performed and

acceptance rate up to 60%

the longest training was only 4 months

Selection and

Selecting qualified clients through

Picked qualified households from a list

Interaction with

door-to-door visits; training is

given by the local village officials

Clients

offered to clients

Formation of Groups

Relatives are rarely in the same

Most of members were relatives

groups
Form of

Discuss and tackle problems

Tried to reduce the frequency of

Communication

through group meetings

meetings

Financial Services

Accept savings

No savings accepted

NA

Recommended to establish a good

(other than loans)
Other

relationship with the local government
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